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another, the privilege of citizens. Imitate the glorious examples of your so worthy progenitors—Yet know that absolute subordination to your chief, and severity of discipline, are the first of martial virtues, without which none can present themselves

with the hope of success in the plains of |

honour. The junta promises itself that you will possess them in an eminent degree.—Let the unholy voice of party passions for ever disappear from among you : and let the suggestions of envy hold no sway in your bosoms. No ; let a perfect and indissoluble union reign among you. Your interests are the same—the sentiments which animate you alike—aud the cause which you defend, common. Will you, therefore, seek to turn your sorce against your brethren and contry men, and to give the victory to your enemies? Perish so disgraceful an idea 1 Let the liberty and property of individuals be most religiously, respected, and let the province of Biscay preserve the purity of its custons. even in the midst of the din of arms.—Biscayans ! The religion of your fishers, according to whose holy maxims you have been educated—the country to which you owe your existence—the Lord (or Sovereign) which the constitution and the laws have prescribed to you—these are the important objects which claim your atention, and oblige you to march out to the florious conflict. Can you bear to be the inctims of one man's ambition who has endeavoured to enslave all Europe 2 No ; . you were not born for slavery.—Hassen then o give the most undoubted proofs of your alour and patriotism, and rely upon all the issistance which the junta can afford you. May your temples be surrounded with laurels of victory, and your name be immoral in the annals of Biscay ! (Signed) D. MATHIAs HERRERo Prieto D. Juan Joseph De Yerxio. D. FRAcisco Bok. A CarADo Dr. Concue R.A., &c. D. Jose Xavi 28 De Goiti A, Secretary of the Jun as Proctamation of our Holy Father Pope Pius PIs, to the Catholic Spaniards. Beloved Children;–You who deplore at the foot of the altar the wounds given to religion—You who are still mindful that we form one people of brethren, join we, the vicar, of Christ; approach ye families, the remnant of vast destruction, to the throne.of my predecessors, to see ine, like Daniel, surrounded by lions 3 preserved hitherto by the inscrutable designs of Providence—I, see the vessel of St. Peter entrusted to my care combated by the fierce apostate, whom Inyself have placed on the

church, to whom he had sworn fidelity at her altar. But let us draw off the veil that covers so great iniquity. The first viction that was sacrificed to his ambition has been your shepherd. Rome, the centre of faith and the shield of religion, has been prostituted. The idol Dagon has been united to the cruel Antioch of our days to accomplish the destruction of religion, which is the great bar to his perfidious designs. However, do not despond. The successor of St. Peter is still extant, though overwhelmed with affliction ; groaning under his chains, he lifts his eyes and tremulous hands to heaven, imploring incessantly the protection of the God of hosts over his flock 1–0h ! the happy effects of religion In this fatal situation, my soul, penetrated with Christian feelings, learns with transport and surprise, that Spain, lappy Spain, has remained true to her r; Agion and king. I hasten, my beloved children, to surmount the shackles by which I am depressed, to transmit to your kingdoms the circular that will testify to you of my gratitude. Arouse, and con-bat, like David, the imperious Goliath of our times.—Valorous Spaniards, sons of the church, come and break the chains of your shepherd. Already my heart assures me of your sensibility; do not tarry ; raise the standard of faith : victory invites you; come then to your brothers in bondage. Raise your tents, and pursue the nsurper of nations. Enter into the heart of his dominions, and follow him to the remotest limits of the earth. Shew to the nations of the North that oppression is in its agony, and let the Spanish sword strike the decisive blow on the guity head. Compassionate the ill-fated kingdom of France, condole with its people, and they will assist you to overwhelm her traitorous tyrant. Oh, with what transport will the Catholic Ferdinand le in the intrepidity and heroic loyalty. of his stiljects The streight situation to which he is, like myself, doomed, precludes the neans to him of manife-ting the sentinents of his magnanimos her.t. I feel not the strength of saying mere. If I survive the calamity, and you spill your blood for religion, your country and monarch, to whom I supplicate from heaven all

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**inate as to be liberated from the numerous

throne, and who, like a degenerate son, o'French troops, which had invaded its prePants for the destruction of his mother, the cincts and vicinity. The council which

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has groaned under their galling yoke, would deem itself wanting to its duty, if, accrediting you and your gallant companions in arms as the deliverers of the country, it did not hasten to manifest to you its satisfaction, and the sentiments with which it hath been constantly animated, and has the happiness to express at present. From the first moment of its liberation it has taken all the measures, that circumstances have allowed, to direct to the common cause, the loyalty and ardent vows of this faithful capital and its whole district; these however, for the present, will not be such as the zeal of the council and of this city would wish ; they will be insufficient to the putting them free from fresh opression.—The council doubts not but your excellency will coincide with then in this request, and contribute to the safety of the capital and its public departments, with all the efficacy in yopr power; and the illustrious proofs of zeal and conduct already most amply by you manifested, are a sufficient assurance to them that you will adopt the means to the exigency of the circumstances.—To his excellency the Captain General of Arrogan, Don Joseph de Palafox y Melzi.-By command of the council.— ARIAs Mow. Awswer of his Ercellency the Captain Ge. neral of Arragon, Don Joseph De Palafor y Melzi, to the Council of Castile. The notification which you, under date of the 4th instant, have communicated to me in the name of the council, and of which I had already the knowledge, has afforded me the most heartfelt gratification. Considering that the inhabitants of the capital, who have endured the most intolerable vexation, owing to their loyal attachment to their sovereign, which will eternally redound to their honour, are now freed of their invaders, it gives alike to me, and to the good inhabitants of this kingdom universally, cause of happiness and exultation.— The unalterable integrity of the council, the dignity of its ministers, and the wise policy of which there has been ere now ample demonstration, has rendered that court respectable even abroad. In the melancholy circumstances in which Spain has been placed by the most unparalleled treachery recorded in history, this court has not fulfilled its duties; many of the individuals of which it was composed have most satisfactorily justified themselves, whilst others, perhaps allured by the seducive promises of the enemy, or enstrained by the perversity of their disposition, have either remained invesolute,

or even taken part against their own country: of this I have had sufficient evidence, and to my inexpressible sorrow have I known s them direct the operations of the enemy, and witnessed then approach with effontery. " the walls of Saragossa, write inflammatory papers, and propagate doctrines dishonourable to the Spanish name.—I am aware that the council has not been at liberty to act freely, and that they have been constrained to serve only as organs of the dispositions of s that execrable government; but the generall on will of the nation having once been expres. sed, it would have been highly important flow they had transferred themselves to the pro. vinces, and made common cause with o

were it only to withdraw their sanction fro the circulation of the scandalousanddeceptions writings which have made their appearance: to and to this no insuperable obstacle appearso to nie to have stood in their way; or had there been any, the common interest an

welfare of the nation ought at any rate o

have risen paramount to every private speci--lation.—It is now nearly two months that

this city has been encompassed by the ene:

my; by the baseness of whose conduct discern that they make crime their study. To rapine, violence, turpitude, and iniquito, they have added ferocity, by sacrificing evedo, infants—the sick and wounded; nay, theit very benefactors. They have bombard this heroic city in a cruel manner; a though their irruption into this kingdo has been well avenged, we have, neverth less, not repulsed them without spilling blood of many a brave and virtuous defend of the country, and without involving mo ny others in distress. Regarding myself, have been more critically situated than an other commander, being without one sing

soldier, and placed within immediate reo of the enemy, from my proximity to his frontiers, and liable to be attacked at onto from Catalonia, Castile, and Navarre; but

in despite of all, our love for king, country. and religion, has made me contemn all din # gers, considering timidity and irresoluti as tantamount to the greatest crime. I ho o spared some assistance to Catalonia, to N* , varre, and other provinces, who have cheer fully acted with me, and claimed my pr | tection, and I have happily been enabled repel the enemy, which I trust shortly put to flight, if any part of the wreck shall remain. Then f : fly to the su. cour of the capital, if needful, which I re quest you to represent to the council so promulgation.

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Printed by Cox and Baylis, Great Queen Street; published by R. Bagshaw, Brydges Street, Covent

Gardeo, where former Numbers may be had : sold also by J. Budd, Crown and Mitre, Pall-Mall. *

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Vol. XIV. No. 13.] I O' DON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1508. [Trics ion.

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SUAIMARY OF PO1, ITiCS

CoNv ENTIo NS IN Port U GAL. T's are is an irksomeness in beginning to write upon a subject, which has already been fully discussed, more especially when the woole of those, to whom one's remarks are addressed, have made up their minds upon it, and wasn there appears nothing to be osiered in oppo. sition to their opinion. Nevertheless, from the consideration, that the Register may be preserved, owi:ig to its bookish form, somewhat longer than most of the other periodical publications of the political kind, I shall state m, opinion of those transactions, which are recorded on the Government Gazette, illsette in another part of this sheet, and which have excited so general a feeling of dissatisfaction —When we took that view of the situation of affairs in Portugal, which

was exhibited to us in the official papers of

Sir Arthur Wellesley (inserted at page 407 of this volume); when we beheld the prowess of our soldiers, in the battles, of which those papers speak ; when we were told, that the French had, besides the advantage of a perfect knowledge of the country and of long preparation, the still greater adsai,” tage of an excellent position whence to make, or where to sustain, an attack; when we were told, just in so many words, that, “in this action, in which the whole “ of the French force in Portugal was employed under the command of the Duke of Abrantes in person, in which the enemy was certainly superior in cavalry and artillery, and in which not more than half of the British army was actually en“gaged, the French sustained a signal defeat, and lost thirteen pieces of cannon, “twenty-three ammunition waggons, with “ powder, shells, stores of all descriptions, “ and twenty thousand rounds of musket “ ammunition.” When we were told all this, and were informed, that, immediately after this brilliant success, our army was augmented to nearly double what it had before been, we naturally expected, that, by the next arrival, seeing that the enemy could receive no supplies, either by land or by sea, we should be informed of his surrender at discretion.—Sir Arthur Wellesley's account has been praised for its clearness. I must confess, that I saw nothing like clear

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*u in it. I saw no where any explicit.

statement respecting the positive annot nt of the French force in Portugal. The way, in which I, were I a commander upon such

an occasion, should proceed, would be this:

The enemy had, in this country, such and such f, ces; they were distributed thus and t", is : my force was socil a.o.d such' and ti, o, a d thus was it d-tributed. Then I should come to an accoont of my prelininary operations; next to a do tool of the engagement; and should conclude with a view of the stoo sh and situation of each ; try after the engage ment. This is the course wn.: mly purs ed by the French is their accounts of their military operations, which, in every quality, except to, it of falsehood, are well worthy of our imitation, but which, upon this occasion, we have, I am afraid, imitated in the exception and not in the rule. From such an account, which is too confused to be readable were it not for the sake of the exhilirating substance, one cannot pretend to say what was the exact force of the French in Portugal. Those who have tuken the pains to collect the fact from scraps, here and there dispersed, state the French force at 'fourteen thousatid men previous to our attack of them, and at ten thousand men after that attack, which ended in a “signal defeat " on their part. Sir Arthur Wellesley's force was seventeen thousand men. Ile did not lose a thousand; and, since the battle, he has been joined by other generals and their troops, raising our army to the strength of thirty thousand men, or thereabouts. Well, then, if it be true, that Sir Arthur Welleslov, with only nine thousand men (the half of his army), beat “the u hole" of the F. cnch force, in spite of all the advantages enjoyed by the former, of previous local familiar ov, long preparation, open retreat, choice of position, and choice of the moment of attack; if this be true, had we not a right to expect, nay, had we not a right to claim and to demand at the hands of the commander in Portugal, when he had thirty thousand men, the capture, or the total destruction, of the remains of the French arm it; Portugal Had we not a right to demand at his hands, the sending of Junot

and his army prisoners of war to that En

gland which they had so often threatened to invade, or the making of them “a for

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sensible of the disgrace which they affix:

upon us, and of the lasting injury, which we, as well as our allies, must sustain from them, we have only to read them. They speak for themselves in a language too plain to be misunderstood. The short view of them is this : The French had an army in Portugal, which army, though completely masters of the country at first, had so plundered the people and had so outraged their feelings of every kind, that, at last, its situation became perilous, and that, too, at a time, when, from the utiexpected resistance of Spain, it became next to impossible for it to receive supplies. We go to the commander of this army, having at our back a force three times as great as his, and having already beaten him with less than a third part of that force, and with him we agree to find shipping to carry him and his army to a place of convenience in France; to carry also, his artillery, his horses, his baggage, his immense plunder, and to take each man and gun so prepared with all requisites as to be able to begin a battle the moment they are landed, and even at sea; to take, lest his baggage or plunder should consist of immoveable articles, the said articles in the way of purchase or exchange; to provide effectually for the security of the persons and property of all those, whether French or Fortugueze, who may have taken part with the spoilers, therein engaging to use the forces (sent for the deliverance of Portugal and for the punishment of its plunderers) so as not only to secure impunity to every villain engaged in such plunder, but also to secure to him the le: gal possession and disposal of what he had thereby acquired, that is to say, if the house and goods of a faithful Portuguese have been confiscated and sold by the French to a traitor, to that traitor we guarantee the quiet enjoyment of such house and goods. Is not this the plain fact 2 Talk to us of the surf, and of the equinor. Why, if there had been a mine under you and the match Jighted ready to blow you into the air, you ought to have spurned at such conditions; conditions, which you have received at the hands of him, whom you, in your bragging * t

POLITICAL REGISTER.—Conventions in Portugal.

“ Chevaliers du bain "

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bombast, call a vanquished enemy. Yet, this is not all. As if it were not sufficient for us to be disgraced in the eyes of the world, and for the Portuguese to be injured

as much as it was in our power to injure

them; as if this were not sufficient, a pretence (for it appears to be merely a pretence) is found for our engaging to make “the Spaniards,” not the Patriots of Spain, not the Spanish Nation, not any thing dignified or honourable, but to make “the “Spaniards" set at liberty, “restore,” as if they had stolen them, all “the French “subjects" detained in Spain and not taken in battle. That is to say, all the horde of spies, intriguers, fomenters of discord, plunderers and cut-throats, who have bean the principal cause of all that the people of Spain have suffered, and who are held in durance, not only because they are capable of still doing mischief, but, doubtless, as a security for the lives of such Spaniards as may, without being taken in arms, fall, or have fallen, into the hands of the French. What right had we, and that too without reference to numbers of persons, to make any such stipulation with respect to Spain Whose authority had we for it By what instrument had the people of Spain placed their honour and their safety in the hands of our What pourer have we to cause such a stipulation to be fulfilled? The promise is like that which a man makes so has him down and holds a knife across his throat, Did the men who made this promise beat the Duke d'Abrantes: or were they like the curs, who, having felt the bite of the mastiff, lost all confidence in their numbers, and, though they bark victory, suffer him to retire in quiet, carrying off his bone to be disposed of at his leisure? No: not so, for they complaisantly carry the bone for him. The naval yields, in no respect, to the military convention. The Emperor Alexander, who is carrying on a desperate and blood-thirsty war against our really faithful and very brave ally, the king of Sweden, had, with a view of cooperating with the French in their project for “restoring the liberty of the seas," or, in other words, destroying the maritime predominance of England, sent a fleet round into the Tagus. For the return of this fleet to Russia, the priests of the Greek church have been saying mass and burning incense any time these nine months past. Our “ Chevaliers du bain" seem to have been penetrated with the supplications and offerings which had hitherto been used in vain; and, though they did not send the fleet home; though they - - - : o, . . on far o ei- wed by owe i. * - s as to raise . . . to to : . . . et to t.eet come do - to go home, uney took care to stio.' * *hat the corers and men of the fleet should be immediatriy carried back to Russia, without any impediment to their being at once employed to fight against us, or against our ally the king of Sweden; that all this should be done at our erpense, and that we should take care of the ships, so as to have them to deliver up at the conclusion of the peace. The Eastern warrior, Sir Arthur Wellesley, had, in his part of the negociation, agreed to let ships and all go home; but, then, there was the chance, at least, of their meeting with an English fleet at sea. This chance, however, was small; for, the start which he had allowed them, would have enabled them to make a French port before our fleet off the Tagus could overtake them ; they might, too, have fallen in with some of our detached ships, who could be in expectation of no such event ; and, in any case, a meeting with them might have cost us lives worth more than those of all the “ Cheva* liers du bain" that ever existed. It must, therefore, be confessed, that what was finally agreed to was a little less bad and less disgraceful than what the conqueror of the Nabob Vizier of Oude had, as far as he was empowered, made an article of the famous convention. But, besides the heretofore unheard-of title and language of this naval agreement, where were the circumstances that could justify it? The fleet was completely in our power. There was scarcely a possibility of their escaping. In a few weeks, unless cowardice seized our army, the batteries, under which the fleet lay, must have been in our bands. Or, whether they were or not, the fleet could not escape. Sir Charles Cotton, therefore, is full as culpable as Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Arthur Wellesley : for, though he did not agree to the terms at first proposed, he agreed to terms very disgraceful to us and injurious to our allies. “The surf and the “ approaching equinor ' " Shades of all the thousands and hundreds of thousands of English seamen, who, without a millionth part of the motive, have perished in braving the waves and the winds and the shoals and the rocks, come forth from the deep and hear this “ The surf and the equisort". Why, it is like the language of the chicken-hearted secretary of Charles XII, who, letting drop the pen, upon part of the room being torn away by a cannon

ball, and being asked by the king why he did not proceed, exclaimed, in a trembling

w, . . . . . . . . . . . . v.

* . . . . . on to 4,5 : ! so '....+ o-' voo woto - " in a nan oils “rs or -, -, -u, oxion 3, ... nger s- orv online m, was not only excuso's but naturally to be expected ; but, to hear commanders of British forces, by sea as well as land, pleading the surf and the equinox as an excuse for having assented to terms confessedly not such as could have been wished for, is enough to fill the nation with anger approaching to madness. There was, Dalrymple says, doubts whether Sir John Moore's division could be safely landed at that season of the year;' but, it appears, that these doubts were not founded, because they were safely landed before the Convention was signed. But, suppose it had been certain that they could not be landed ? Wellesley (for it is time to have done with long names) had, as he says, beaten the whole of the French force with one half of his, and his army had received an augmentation before Sir John Moore arrived. What, then, had the landing of Sir John Moore's division to do with the matter 2 Indeed, it would seem to have been better for him not to land, but to wait for orders from home. At any rate, however, landed he was before the convention was signed, so that the excuse is completely nullified. Then comes the excuse about provisions. “It was doubted, “ whether the supply of so large an army “ with provisions from the ships could be provided for, under all the disadvantages “, to which the shipping were exposed.” The Knight's grammar is, to say the least of it, quite equal to his logic. What, them. it would seem, that here was an army sent to Portugal, without due precautions taken as to finding it in food? For, observe, the difficulties and dangers of the seas are, upon such occasions, always taken into view at the war-office and the admiralty. But now, we are, it seems, to be told, that, after all the immense expense of this armament ; after an expense of preparation such as never was heard of before for such an onterprize; after all this, we are to be very coolly told, that there were doubts as to the possibility of supplying the army with food, even for a sortnight or three weeks Let us see : there were, after Sir John Moore landed, about thirty thousand men. Coold not these men have been fed for a fortnight or three weeks, without producing a famine in Portugal, even supposing it impossible to get any thing at all from the ships ? Can Dalrymple say, that there was not already a week or ten days' provision in the army 2 It will be proved, I think, that there was.

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