have already noticed that in the days before they were incorporated the cost of the annual feast was limited to fourteen pence a head, but, making allowance for the altered value of money, as time went on the charges for dinners and "potation money" advanced considerably. There were election dinners, dinners on Lord Mayor's day, audit dinners, dinners after the anatomical lectures, dinners on St. Bartholomew's Day, and upon other occasions. We may hope some of these feasts are still observed, and that the ancient toast, "The Worshipful Company of Barbers, Root and Branch, and may it flourish for ever," is duly honoured.

On certain occasions ladies were admitted to the dinners, and it was ordered in 1503 that every member attending the feast on the day the wardens were presented to the Lord Mayor was to pay twenty pence for himself, and if he brought his wife with him two shillings. The widows of members were, by an ordinance of 1613, allowed to share in the hospitalities at the Hall provided they paid their quarterages. Nine years later, the funds being too low, there was no election dinner, only cakes and wine; and in 1649, in respect of the hardness and troubles of the times, "the Court consented there should be no second course, and no woman at the feast." After the Restoration matters must have improved, for Pepys was present at an anatomical lecture in 1663, followed by "a fine dinner and good learned company." The worthy diarist was no bad judge, and complacently notes that he was treated with "extraordinary great respect."

In 1638 the opening of Inigo Jones's new theatre was celebrated by an elaborate banquet, attended by the Lords of the Council, and the bill amounted to £84 5s. 4d., exclusive of wine. Glass and plate were hired, and some of the former was broken and had to be paid for. We have the details of three dinners in 1676. A leg of mutton cost three shillings and fourpence, a sirloin of beef nine shillings, three chickens and three rabbits five shillings and sixpence, eight artichokes one shilling, and four cauliflowers one shilling and threepence. For buttered ale, the ingredients of which were a hundred eggs, eight gallons of ale; two pounds of butter, eight pounds of sugar, and one ounce of nutmegs, the charge was ten shillings and elevenpence. In March 1678 a whole cod cost fourteen shillings, but twelve teal and three ducks only fifteen shillings and ninepence, while oysters were two shillings a quart. Westphalia hams were six or eight shillings each, geese three shillings and sixpence, and turkeys two shillings and twopence. A brace of bucks cost eight pounds thirteen shillings; they were put into eight pasties at a further expense of four pounds. Green peas appear in the bill of fare for the

Some of the

first time in 1693, and then at an October dinner. members of the Company were allowed to take away the remains of these feasts, and there is an entry in one of the books that after an entertainment in July 1729, Messrs. Truelove and Fradin, who both subsequently filled the office of master, carried off "four dozen quarts of wine, one whole venison pasty, one whole goose, one whole fowl, and several lemons and sugar."

The Barber Surgeons in the last century maintained the national reputation for drinking. In 1721 a hogshead of port, six gallons of mountain, six gallons of white port, and three gallons of Canary are stated to have been consumed at the Company's dinner on Lord Mayor's day. We may hope there is some exaggeration here, for the Company was not a large one. But in 1735 seventy-nine gallons of wine were provided for a similar occasion, and are expressly stated to have been drunk. It is melancholy to have to add that after the separation of the Barbers and Surgeons the "Potation Money" was cut down, and small beer begins to appear at the dinners.

J. A. J. HOUSDEN

THE SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL PANIC.

N°

O intelligent conception of the existing relations between Commerce and Banking can be had without an extensive acquaintance with the various forces and circumstances of which they are the result. The present is doubtless the offspring of the past, but how far is the pedigree to be traced? The further back inquiry is pursued the more curious but the less instructive it becomes, the remoter causes become so modified when not obliterated by more recent events during the lapse of time. Many storms are reported to have left America that never reach our shores, having spent themselves and become dissipated in the wide Atlantic; others, again, spring up in mid-ocean, and without electric warning burst in all their unexpected fury on our western coasts. The period of forty-five years that has clapsed since the famous legislation of Sir Robert Peel furnishes nearly every possible variety of Commercial Pressure and Panic, more than one repeated with wearisome reiteration. It may therefore form a fitting period for this review.

Whatever may be the defects of the Banking Acts of 1844 and 1845, they cannot be attributed to hasty legislation. A series of Parliamentary inquiries had been held upon the subject, conducted by the best available talent of the time, although the results were somewhat conflicting. Chiefly owing to the financial reputation, political skill, and personal influence of Sir Robert Peel, these Acts were passed at a time when the country was at peace and trade generally prosperous. In 1842, 1843, and 1844 there had been a succession of good harvests, and, as far as this was possible with the Corn Laws still in force, food was cheap and plentiful. The introduction and rapid extension of steamboats and the railway system caused great activity in the iron and building trades, giving steady employment and high wages to the working classes, and by the increased facility in the transit of goods capital was both economised

and rendered doubly effective. Banking shared in the general prosperity, the reserve at the Bank of England being unusually high, and the rate of discount falling as low as 1 per cent. Unfortunately this tide of prosperity carried with it the seeds of failure, which soon fructified into the disastrous time that followed so close behind, like a grim and ghastly shadow.

The causes of the Panic that ensued were of a complicated character. During the years 1844-7 Parliament authorised the construction of railways representing a capital of £221,000,coo; and of that sum, during the same period £80,000,000 were actually spent. This was an attempt to do at a rush what ought to have been the well-considered work of many years. Speculation in shares knew no bounds. The shares of one railway with 2 10s. paid-up rose in a few weeks to £23 155.; and those of another, with £4 paid, sold for £42 155. When this mad stage was reached, it ceases to be surprising that railways were projected to the most obscure towns and villages; some even to places that never existed. These are the times when money is plentiful and credit cheap, when the birds of prey who never miss a chance are always in the air, bringing honest enterprise into disrepute. With the interest on deposits so low, many were tempted to invest their savings in one of these schemes which promised so profitable a return. Even had all the railways projected possessed the elements of ultimate success, the mere transfer so suddenly of so large a portion of floating and available capital into a fixed and permanent form with no possibility of its becoming immediately remunerative must inevitably have caused a great scarcity of that loanable capital for ordinary commercial purposes with which Bankers trade. It was only a few years before that the practical utility of railways was warmly disputed, and now the reaction had set in, the heresy scouted so recently became transformed into a popular and senseless superstition.

Another of the untoward elements that helped to create the Panic of 1847 was the most extraordinary fluctuations in the price of corn. The entire failure of the potato crop in Ireland, which caused a famine there, and the deficiency in the English harvest of 1846, caused an enormous rise in the price of wheat, which ran as high as 120s.; great importations were accordingly made to meet this demand which promised to prove so profitable. Besides the legitimate traders, there flocked the usual crowd of hungry speculators, mainly supported by accommodation-paper, who wished to share the seemingly rich spoils. The harvest of 1847 proving better than was anticipated, the price of wheat, which in May had actually reached

1315., dropped in September to 50s., the fall bringing with it ruin, not merely to the horde of penniless adventurers and the Banks and Bill-brokers that supplied them with funds, but, as always happens, many honourable firms were involved in the crash.

Such being the very grave condition of commercial affairs, how did the Banking section of the community meet the emergency? Nothing is inore foolish and feeble than the wisdom that comes after the event, and with an air of supreme superiority sits in judgment, dealing out with lavish hand censure and blame to those who bore the burden and heat of the day. Every consideration should be shown to those who had to act promptly during a period of such intense excitement, but both Business and Banking can ill afford to lose the lessons purchased by such bitter experience. Although the London banks, and especially the Bank of England, must have known that an immense reduction had for several years been taking place in the customary resources of their business by the extraordinary expansion of the railway system transferring so large a portion of the loanable capital into a permanent form, yet they appear to have made no attempt for a long time to restrict the mad craze by raising for their own protection the rate of discount or offering higher interest for deposits. Besides, owing to the failure of the harvest, they must have known that large importations of foreign wheat were taking place during May, June, and July, 1846, and the Foreign Exchanges having been for some time unfavourable, gold to a large amount must be exported to pay for these, thus materially reducing the reserve at the Bank of England; yet it was not until the middle of January next year that the rate was raised, and then only per cent. No possible manipulation of the rate of discount could have quite staved off the concurrent action of two such powerful factors as the railway mania and the speculations in corn; but it cannot be doubted that a wise and judicious raising of the rate some time earlier might have lessened the intensity of the pressure by spreading it over a longer period, and possibly averted panic.

Those who blame the Act of 1844 for what occurred in 1847 forget that there is no evidence whatever that the directors of the Bank of England, were there no legislative restriction, would have expanded the circulation of their own accord any sooner than the time when the Government authorised the Suspension of the Act. The Panic of 1847 is sometimes described as a Commercial and not a Banking crisis. But this distinction is more superficial than correct. No doubt, many of the railway speculators were depositors over whom Bankers have little control. But a considerable portion of