Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic PerformanceCambridge University Press, 26 oct 1990 - 152 páginas Continuing his groundbreaking analysis of economic structures, Douglass North develops an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time. Institutions exist, he argues, due to the uncertainties involved in human interaction; they are the constraints devised to structure that interaction. Yet, institutions vary widely in their consequences for economic performance; some economies develop institutions that produce growth and development, while others develop institutions that produce stagnation. North first explores the nature of institutions and explains the role of transaction and production costs in their development. The second part of the book deals with institutional change. Institutions create the incentive structure in an economy, and organizations will be created to take advantage of the opportunities provided within a given institutional framework. North argues that the kinds of skills and knowledge fostered by the structure of an economy will shape the direction of change and gradually alter the institutional framework. He then explains how institutional development may lead to a path-dependent pattern of development. In the final part of the book, North explains the implications of this analysis for economic theory and economic history. He indicates how institutional analysis must be incorporated into neo-classical theory and explores the potential for the construction of a dynamic theory of long-term economic change. Douglass C. North is Director of the Center of Political Economy and Professor of Economics and History at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a past president of the Economic History Association and Western Economics Association and a Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has written over sixty articles for a variety of journals and is the author of The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (CUP, 1973, with R.P. Thomas) and Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton, 1981). Professor North is included in Great Economists Since Keynes edited by M. Blaug (CUP, 1988 paperback ed.) |
Índice
An introduction to institutions and institutional change | 2 |
Cooperation the theoretical problem | 2 |
The behavioral assumptions in a theory of institutions | 17 |
A transaction cost theory of exchange | 27 |
Informal constraints | 36 |
Formal constraints | 46 |
Enforcement | 54 |
Institutions and transaction and transformation costs | 61 |
Stability and institutional change | 83 |
The path of institutional change | 92 |
Economic performance | 105 |
Institutions economic theory and economic performance | 107 |
Stability and change in economic history | 118 |
Incorporating institutional analysis into economic history prospects and puzzles | 131 |
141 | |
147 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todo
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance Douglass C. North Vista previa restringida - 1990 |
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance Douglass C. North No hay ninguna vista previa disponible - 1990 |
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance Douglass C. North No hay ninguna vista previa disponible - 1990 |
Términos y frases comunes
activity actors agents agreements alter analysis argument assumptions attempt attributes bargaining behavior capital century Chapter characteristics choices common complex consequence consistent constitutional context continuous contracts cooperation costly countries created deal define dependence described determine economic economic history effective efficient enforcement evolution evolved exchange existing explore fact firm force formal rules forms function gains growth hence human implications important incentives increasing incremental individuals influence informal constraints institutional change institutional framework interaction interests issues kinds knowledge labor lead major marginal markets maximizing measurement merchant neoclassical norms North Northwest Ordinance opportunities organizations outcomes particular parties path perceptions performance persistence play players political possible problems production property rights reflect relative result returns role shape simple social societies solution sources specific story structure subjective successful theory tions trade transaction costs understanding United University
Referencias a este libro
Institutional Theory in Political Science: The 'new Institutionalism' B. Guy Peters No hay ninguna vista previa disponible - 2005 |