Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Penguin UK, 30 ago. 1990 - 256 páginas
An insight into moral skepticism of the 20th century. The author argues that our every-day moral codes are an 'error theory' based on the presumption of moral facts which, he persuasively argues, don't exist. His refutation of such facts is based on their metaphysical 'queerness' and the observation of cultural relativity.
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absolute accept act utilitarianism actual agent agreement argued argument argument from queerness broad sense categorical imperative causal causally determined Chapter chosen end claim to objectivity commendation compatibilism concepts conflict consequences consequentialist constraints Deontology descriptive meaning desires determinism dispositions distinction egoism endorse ethics eudaimonia fact fairly game theory happiness Hobbes human Hume Hume’s hypothetical imperative ideals incompatibilists institution interests kind logical thesis maxims meaning of moral merely Mill’s moral judgements moral scepticism moral system moral terms moral thought moral values motive narrow sense natural notion objective values objectively prescriptive obliquely intended one’s open question argument order moral particular perhaps person point of view possible premiss principles promising Protagoras question R.M. Hare rational relations responsibility rule utilitarianism satisfy second effect second stage social someone sort stage of universalization straight rule subjectivism substantive practical supposed theory things third stage universalizability utility virtue wrong