Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman AnimalsDuke University Press, 1995 - 370 páginas In Beyond Prejudice, Evelyn B. Pluhar defends the view that any sentient conative being--one capable of caring about what happens to him or herself--is morally significant, a view that supports the moral status and rights of many nonhuman animals. Confronting traditional and contemporary philosophical arguments, she offers in clear and accessible fashion a thorough examination of theories of moral significance while decisively demonstrating the flaws in the arguments of those who would avoid attributing moral rights to nonhumans. Exposing the traditional view--which restricts the moral realm to autonomous, fully fledged "persons"--as having horrific implications for the treatment of many humans, Pluhar goes on to argue positively that sentient individuals of any species are no less morally significant than the most automomous human. Her position provides the ultimate justification that is missing from previous defenses of the moral status of nonhuman animals. In the process of advancing her position, Pluhar discusses the implications of determining moral significance for children and "abnormal" humans as well as its relevance to population policies, the raising of animals for food or product testing, decisions on hunting and euthanasia, and the treatment of companion animals. In addition, the author scrutinizes recent assertions by environmental ethicists that all living things or that natural objects and ecosystems be considered highly morally significant. This powerful book of moral theory challenges all defenders of the moral status quo--which decrees that animals decidedly do not count--to reevaluate their convictions. |
Índice
Candidates for Inclusion in the Moral Community1 Frequently Held | 63 |
Failure to Address the Issue67 Unsuccessful Attacks on the Argument | 120 |
A Brief History125 Attempts to Show That | 139 |
Relevant Characteristic140 Attempts to Show That Speciesism | 171 |
Replaceability199 Return to the Case of the Wretched Child212 | 212 |
Attempts to Provide Justification for the Moral Considerability | 226 |
Significance of Beings Who Are Not Full Persons226 Justifying | 268 |
Notes | 303 |
349 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todo
Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals Evelyn B. Pluhar Vista de fragmentos - 1995 |
Términos y frases comunes
Abortion accept According agency analogy Animal Liberation Animal Pain Animal Rights appeal argued argument from marginal autonomy basic moral rights behavior believe biconditional capacity Carruthers Carruthers's chapter child chimpanzees claim conscious death defense deny discussion Environmental Ethics example existence experience exploitation extended prior-existence view fact freedom and well-being Frey full moral full persons full-personhood view Gewirth harm Harrison holds homocentrism human and nonhuman Ibid implications important morally relevant individuals infants innocent justified Kanzi killing L. W. Sumner lives logically marginal humans maximally maximum moral significance Melden mentally moral agents moral community moral status Moral Theory morally considerable morally relevant respects Narveson nonhuman animals nonpersons normal humans obligations one's personhood Peter Carruthers Peter Singer philosophers potential full preference preference utilitarianism premise principle rational Regan reject replaceability argument reply Rollin Sapontzis self-conscious sense sentient nonhumans speciesism speciesist suffering Theodicy Tom Regan treatment utilitarianism utility wrong