Rational Changes in Science: Essays on Scientific Reasoning
THE PROBLEMS OF SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY Fashion is a fickle mistress. Only yesterday scientific rationality enjoyed considerable attention, consideration, and even reverence among phi losophers; "but today's fashion leads us to despise it, and the matron, rejected and abandoned as Hecuba, complains; modo maxima rerum, tot generis natisque potens - nunc trahor exui, inops", to cite Kant for our purpose, who cited Ovid for his. Like every fashion, ours also has its paradoxical aspects, as John Watkins correctly reminds in an essay in this volume. Enthusiasm for science was high among philosophers when significant scientific results were mostly a promise, it declined when that promise became an undeniable reality. Nevertheless, as with the decline of any fashion, even the revolt against scientific rationality has some reasonable grounds. If the taste of the philosophical community has changed so much, it is not due to an incident or a whim. This volume is not about the history of and reasons for this change. Instead, it provides a view of the new emerging image of scientific rationality in both its philosophical and historical aspects. In particular, the aim of the contributions gathered here is to focus on the concept around which the discussions about rationality have mostly taken place: scientific change.
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How Not to Talk About Conceptual Change in Science
The Myth of the Framework
A New View of Scientific Rationality
Science Protoscience and Pseudoscience
Methodology Heuristics and Rationality
The Case of the Tides
accepted Alan Musgrave Anaximander argue arguments assumptions Cartesians celestial matter claim cognitive Cohen conceptual change concerned conjectural Conjectures and Refutations consequentialist Continental Drift Copernican corroborated critical Descartes Dordrecht earth electric empirical epistemic epistemic value epistemology evaluation evidence example experience explanation fact fluid framework frog Galileo Galvani geologists geometric proof heuristic Huygens hypothesis idea important incommensurable inductive inference inquiry Johann Bernoulli justification Karl Popper knowledge Kuhn Lakatos language Laudan least Leiden jar logic of discovery mathematical matter McMullin means methodology motion myth Newton Newtonian Nickles Organon parapsychology phenomena Philosophy of Science physical Pitt Popper possible predictive probability problem protoscience pseudoscience question realism reason Reidel relevant Rescher rules Scientific Discovery scientific method scientific realism scientific theories scientists sense structure terrestrial testable theoretical tion tradition true truth Tuomela understanding vortex Wartofsky Wegener Wegener's